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This paper examines the evidence in bank equity markets concerning bank regulatory policies in 
Japan over the turbulent 1995-1998 period. We find that investors grouped banks according to 
regulatory status in assessing whether a bank was currently treated as “too-big-to-fail.” When a 
failure of a bank of certain regulatory status was announced, excess returns on other banks of that 
regulatory status and below displayed heightened sensitivity to adverse news. This suggests that 
investors updated their beliefs about which classes of banks were protected by to-big-to-fail 
policies over the course of the sample. The pattern that emerges suggests that government officials 
pursued a policy of “regulatory triage,” where initially Credit Cooperatives, then Second Regional 
banks, then First Regional banks, and finally City banks were allowed to fail.  
 
JEL classification numbers: G21, G38 
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1.  Introduction  
Government bank regulatory policy has traditionally favored banks whose failure would be 
threatening to the system as a whole. Such banks are commonly designated as “too-big-to-fail” 
(TBTF). The implication of a TBTF designation is that the regulatory authority is the ultimate 
guarantor of the bank’s liabilities [e.g. see Roth (1994)]. The practice of TBTF policy is controversial. 
While supporting an insolvent large bank may be optimal ex-post, as its failure may lead to instability 
in the entire banking system, it may create moral hazard problems ex-ante. In particular, TBTF policy 
may reduce the incentives for large depositors and investors to impose financial discipline on lenders 
[Black, et al (1997)].
1 The policy also distorts bank lending incentives, as weak banks have an 
incentive to grow in order to attain TBTF status.  
The United States officially abandoned its TBTF policy by enacting the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. This law requires the resolution of failed banks at 
the lowest cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). While the law provides the 
possibility of exceptions for banks whose failure “…would have serious adverse effects on economic 
conditions or financial stability,” it restricts such designations. The systemic threat that would be 
posed by an institution’s failure must be acknowledged by the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the 
United States Treasury, and reviewed by the General Accounting Office. Moreover, the costs of any 
assistance given to a large insolvent bank are to be borne by the entire banking industry, who are likely 
to question the unwarranted designation of an insolvent institution as too big to fail [Wall (1993)].  
In Japan, bank regulators have historically resisted closing failed banks more forcefully than 
their U.S. counterparts. Through most of the post-war era, the resolution of failed Japanese banks was 
conducted under the “convoy system.” This system insulated taxpayers from liabilities associated with 
the closure of failed banks. When banks found themselves experiencing extreme difficulties, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) typically intervened by merging the troubled bank with a healthy bank. 
Before the 1990’s, the Japanese government had bailed out almost all failed banks or financial 
institutions by arranging the mergers and acquisition by other banks. Under the convoy system, the 
                                        
1   For example, see Hetzel (1991), Charles and Lamy (1992), and Wall (1993).  2 
commercial banks effectively provided their own financial safety net [see Hoshi (1999) and Spiegel 
(1999a)]. 
Rather than a TBTF policy, then, the Japanese regulatory regime could be characterized as a 
“no failure” policy prior to the 1990’s. For example, when Heiwa Sogo Bank fell into financial 
difficulties in 1985, the MOF arranged a merger with Sumitomo Bank. The merger was assisted with 
approximately 200 billion yen from the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and other banks.  
With the financial turbulence experienced in the 1990s, however, the Japanese government 
was forced to abandon its no failure policy. The number of bank failures in that decade exceeded those 
in the preceding post-war era. The sheer size of the liabilities associated with these failures had two 
primary effects: First, side payments to banks, such as the provision of valuable branching rights under 
the convoy system, were no longer sufficient to induce solvent banks to acquire failed banks [Spiegel 
(1999b)]. Instead, the government modified the convoy approach. Rather than placing the full burden 
of resolution on the acquiring bank, the government used the funds of the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (DIC) and groups of healthy commercial banks to finance the burden of resolving failed 
banks. Second, the government was forced to give up its “no failure” policy. In its place, the 
government pursued a form of “regulatory triage,” under which the set of banks classified as TBTF 
was progressively narrowed as the financial situation deteriorated and the funds of the DIC were 
depleted.  
The government initially allowed only small banks to fail, such as Toyo Shinkin Bank in 1991. 
Over time, Second and then First Regional banks were also exposed to failure. Finally, with the 
failures of Hokkaido Takushoku and Long Term Credit Bank (LTCB), it became clear the even the 
largest banks were no longer covered under a credible TBTF policy. 
The announcement of a bank failure may provide relevant information for the value of 
surviving banks in a number of dimensions: First, it may convey negative information about the true 
underlying health of the financial system. Because Japanese disclosure standards had permitted banks 
to overstate their financial positions, failure announcements reveal bad news about institutions’ true 
positions [Genay (1999)].  
Second, it may convey information about the regulatory regime in which banks operate, as 
well as the probability of future changes in regulatory regime. If classes of banks are believed to enjoy 3 
similar levels of regulatory protection, news concerning the failure of a bank within a certain class 
alters the market’s perception of the coverage of the entire class under TBTF policy. For example, the 
failure of Hyogo Bank, the second largest Regional bank in 1995, revealed that Second Regional 
banks were exposed to failure. The failure also increased the probability that larger banks, particularly 
First Regional banks, would also lose their TBTF status in the future. Similarly, the failure of 
Hokkaido Takushoku in November 1997 revealed that even City Banks were no longer immune from 
failure, despite the fact that the government had insisted that the top 20 Japanese banks were TBTF.  
Finally, failure announcements convey negative information about large individual debtors of 
the failed bank. This latter information may have heterogeneous impacts on surviving banks to the 
extent that the market is aware of differences in bank exposure.  
We argue that the loss of TBTF coverage was observed and priced in bank equity markets, 
even before these changes in regulatory policy were officially announced. We demonstrate that 
“watershed” bank failures, in which a bank of a class that had not previously experienced failures was 
allowed to fail, exposed other banks within that class to more rigorous market discipline. We test this 
argument with evidence from Japanese equity markets by examining the effects of bank failure 
announcements on bank equity values. 
We follow Aharony and Swary (1996), who used an event study methodology to investigate 
the impacts of bank failures on surviving bank equity values in the United States. Our study examines 
daily returns on Japanese banks. We also allow for changes in market risk. Finally, as in Kane and 
Gibson (1996), we use a multivariate market model to estimate abnormal returns and systematic risk. 
There are a number of previous studies that examine the market’s response to perceived 
changes in bank regulatory policy. O’Hara and Shaw (1990) examine the response to the government’s 
1984 announcement that a failure by one of a group of large U.S. commercial banks would have 
systemic implications, which implied that these banks were covered by TBTF policy. They find that 
the market priced the announcement positively for banks designated as systemic. In a related study, 
Flannery and Sorescu, (1996) found that the loss of TBTF protection in the United States increased the 
market’s sensitivity to bank risk. There are mixed results concerning the effect of the announcement 
on banks not included in the list as TBTF. O’Hara and Shaw find no measurable impact on 4 
unmentioned banks, while Swary (1986), finds a negative valuation effect and Black, et al (1997) find 
evidence of a positive impact.  
In the case of Japan, Peek and Rosengren (1998) investigated the effect of bank failures on the 
“Japan premium,” the premium that Japanese banks paid relative to their U.S. and U.K. competitors on 
Eurodollar and Euroyen loans. They find that the Japan premium responded most to news about 
failures that disclosed additional financial losses. For example, they find that the large undisclosed 
losses revealed at the Yamaichi Securities failure exacerbated the Japan premium, while the Hokkaido 
Takushoku failure did not. Brewer, et al (1999) examine the impact of bank failure announcements on 
the equity values of surviving Japanese banks. Their results demonstrate that shareholders interpreted 
these failures as adverse changes in the banking system. They also found that the sensitivity of banks 
to news concerning bank failures was systematically related to bank financial health. However, they 
do not explicitly examine changes in TBTF policy over time.
2 
Our results demonstrate that investors perceived that Japanese regulators moved from a “no 
failure” policy to a TBTF policy over the 1990s. The market treated classes of banks as subject to 
similar levels of regulatory status. On learning of the closure of a bank, the market appears to have 
placed greater discipline on bank of equal and lesser regulatory status. In particular, the equity values 
of banks of equal or lesser regulatory status exhibit greater sensitivity to future bank closure 
announcements, and the excess returns of banks can be related to indicators of bank asset risk.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of about 
Japanese banking policy in the 1990’s. Section 3 explains the methodology used in the paper. Section 
4 provides the results from event studies of portfolios of bank equity. Section 5 provides 
cross-sectional evidence from individual banks. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Japanese bank failures in the 1990’s 
Over its first twenty years following inception in 1971, Japan was never forced to use DIC 
funds to rescue a failing bank. This era of stability ended abruptly, however, with the collapse of 
Japanese real estate and equity markets. In 1992, the DIC provided eight billion yen in low-interest 
                                        
2   Brewer, et al (1999) do introduce dummies for classes of banks in their cross-sectional regressions. However, these are 
introduced to control for regulatory differences, rather than as the focus of their investigation.  
 5 
loans to induce the Iyo Bank to acquire the failed Toho Sogo Bank. Three months later, the DIC 
provided twenty billion yen to Sanwa Bank to encourage it to acquire the failed Toyo Shinkin Bank.  
Initially, most considered the Toho Sogo and Toyo Shinkin Bank failures isolated incidents, 
attributable mainly to mismanagement. Market investors still widely believed that the MOF and the 
BOJ could stabilize the banking sector. Nevertheless, these failures were shortly followed by 
“convoy” style rescues of two more small banks, Kamaishi Shinkin Bank and Osaka Fumin Credit 
Cooperative, in 1993. 
Table 1 reports the 18 major financial institution bankruptcies that took place in Japan from 
1995 through 1998. We define a large failure as one that cost the DIC more than 100 million yen. The 
announcement date in the table refers to the time that the market was able to process the new 
information produced by the failure announcements. For example, the Hyogo Bank failure was 
announced after the market’s close on August 30, 1995. The announcement date for that failure is 
recorded as August 31. 
Japan experienced three large failures of depository institutions in the summer of 1995, 
followed by a fourth in December. The Cosmo Credit Cooperative was ordered to suspend its business 
in July 1995 by its primary regulator, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The credit cooperative was 
primarily liquidated with funds from its largest creditor, Sanwa Bank, but a number of other banks, the 
National Federation of Credit Cooperatives, the DIC, and the Tokyo metropolitan government also 
contributed to the resolution of the failed financial institution. Kizu Credit Cooperative failed in 
August of 1995. The Osaka Prefecture government played a key role in forming Kizu’s resolution plan. 
Sanwa Bank and others who had invested in the Kizu’s non-bank subsidiaries, bore a share of the 
resolution burden. Since both of these failures represented credit cooperatives, their failures had 
limited implications for the credibility of TBTF protection on banks.  
The failure of Hyogo Bank at the end of August 1995, on the other hand, represented the first 
major bank liquidation since World War II. The government’s resolution plan called for other financial 
institutions and major companies in the Hyogo prefecture to contribute to the establishment of a new 
bank. The government also announced that the stockholders of Hyogo Bank would lose their equity 
value, and that the former vice president of Sakura Bank would be installed as the new bank’s 
president. The liquidation of Hyogo Bank demonstrated that Japanese banks were now expected to 6 
share in the burden of the resolution of failed banks. Peek and Rosengren (1998) note that the “Japan 
premium,” under which Japanese banks faced additional costs of funds began just after the Hyogo 
Bank’s failure.  
However, the resolution of the Hyogo failure did not imply that the government was moving 
towards a laissez-faire policy. First, the Hyogo bank was too small to cause systemic risk to the 
banking system. This left open the possibility that the government would still consider a larger bank 
TBTF. Second, the government also contributed to the establishment of the successor bank, Midori. 
Third, the government had tried to arrange a merger or acquisition of Hyogo bank along the lines of the 
modified convoy system. 
A number of other failures followed. The resolution of the Osaka Credit Cooperative failure in 
December 1995 followed the modified convoy method. The DIC gave 170 billion yen to the acquiring 
Tokai Bank and bought 83 billion yen of non-performing loans. These loans were transferred to the 
Resolution and Collection Bank. Taiheiyo Bank, a Second Regional bank, failed in 1996. The DIC 
contributed 117 billion yen to the resolution of that failed bank. Four city banks, Sakura Bank, Fuji 
Bank, Tokai Bank, and Sanwa Bank, renounced their claims on Taiheiyo Bank. By and large, the 
resolution of these bank failures suggested that the government was still pursuing the modified convoy 
method towards bank resolution when doing so was not prohibitively expensive. 
The first regulatory watershed occurred with the failure of a Hanwa Bank, a Second Regional 
bank, in November 1996. Hanwa was ordered to suspend business, except for the repayment of 
deposits. Unlike the previous closures, the MOF did not attempt to find a rescuing bank. All liabilities 
were assumed by the DIC and the bank was closed. 
Following Hanwa bank, the next major failure was the bankruptcy of Nissan Life Insurance in 
April of 1997. Nissan’s failure had important implications for the banking industry because life 
insurance companies are the primary purchasers of preferred bank stocks and engage in extensive 
subordinated lending towards banks. The failure of Nissan deteriorated the ability of banks to raise 
equity to finance loan losses and maintain required capital ratios. 
The failures of Tanabe Credit Cooperative and Chogin Osaka Credit Cooperatives in May 
1997 were treated similarly. All financial losses stemming from the liquidation of these institutions 7 
were borne by the DIC. Sakura Bank took over the deposits and performing loans of the Tanabe Credit 
Cooperative.”  
The failure of Kyoto Kyoei bank in October 1997 appears to represent a temporary reversion to 
the modified convoy system. Koufuku, the acquiring bank, absorbed all branches and employees of 
Kyoto Kyoei. Although both banks were members of the Egawa Group, there was no legal obligation 
for Koufuku Bank to acquire Kyoto Kyoei.  
During this period, then, regulators exhibited the willingness to close and liquidate credit 
cooperatives and second-tier regional banks. There was also an apparent regime change in the desire 
of regulators to continue the “modified convoy system” with the liquidation of Hanwa bank. However, 
the non-liquidation of Kyoto Kyoei demonstrated that regulators still preferred to arrange a merger of 
a failed bank, if doing so were not prohibitively expensive. 
The pace at which banks and financial institutions lost their regulatory guarantees increased 
markedly with the wave of bank and securities company failures in November of 1997. Most notable 
was the first announced failure of a city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. Hokkaido Takushoku had 
5500 employees and 133 branches. On November 25, the MOF also decided to liquidate Tokuyou City 
Bank, a Second Regional Bank. Sendai Bank, Seventy-Seven Bank, and other institutions acquired its 
deposits and performing loans. All financial losses were placed on the DIC and these banks were not 
forced to employ Tokuyou’s workers. 
Two large Japanese securities companies also failed that month. On November 3, Sanyo 
Securities suspended portions of its business filed with the Tokyo District Court for reorganization. 
Sanyo Securities had suffered heavy losses from real estate. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Daiwa Bank, 
and Nippon Credit Bank, had all provided financial assistance to Sanyo since 1994. These banks were 
asked to contribute to the resolution of Sanyo’s bankruptcy. 
On November 25, Yamaichi Securities failed, revealing that it had failed to disclose 200 billion 
yen in losses. Yamaichi was one of the big four Japanese security firms. Fuji Bank, Yamaichi’s main 
bank, did not provide it with any assistance, which was contrary to standard main bank practices. The 
conventional application of the modified convoy program would have had Fuji or the MOF arrange a 
group of banks to participate in its rescue. Yamaichi’s failure therefore set an important precedent 
reducing the burden of healthy banks. The impact of Yamaichi’s failure on banks is therefore mixed. 8 
While the failure demonstrated that firms in Japan were in even worse financial positions than 
investors had previously believed, neither Fuji nor other commercial banks were asked to share the 
burden of its resolution.  
Wakayamaken Credit Cooperative failed in March of 1998. The resolution of this bank 
followed the Hanwa pattern. Kiyou Bank acquired its deposits and performing loans, while the DIC 
absorbed all financial losses. Kiyou was not forced to employ workers of the failing institution. 
The Midori Bank’s liquidation in May of 1998 was another that appeared to represent a 
temporary reversion to the modified convoy system. Rather than liquidating the Midori Bank, the 
government arranged a merger with Hanshin Bank by purchasing 266 billion yen of bad debt from 
Midori and making a 790 billion yen side-payment to Hanshin. The government admitted that Midori 
was a “special case” because of the bank’s importance to firms adversely affected by the Kobe 
earthquake. Therefore, the implications of the resolution of Midori for the rest of the banking system 
are limited. 
Finally, the Law Concerning Emergency Measures for the Reconstruction of the Functions of 
the Financial System and the Financial Function Early Restoration Law were passed in October 1998. 
The first law allows the authorities to deal with a failed bank without first finding a receiving bank. 
The second law provided financing for bank resolution. The law created a 60 trillion yen pool of funds. 
25 trillion yen was to be used for recapitalizing weak but viable banks, 18 trillion yen was to be used 
for government purchases of shares in failed banks, and the remaining 17 trillion yen was to be used 
for guaranteeing deposits at failed banks. Shortly following the law’s passage, LTCB and Nippon 
Credit Bank (NCB) were temporarily nationalized. As both banks were insolvent, their equity values 
were set to zero. 
In summary, over the 1995-1998 period, the government lost its capacity to maintain its no 
failure policy. The policy change evolved in two dimensions: First, the government slowly, and with 
some temporary backtracking, was forced to abandon the convoy approach to bank resolution, which 
placed a share of the resolution burden on the commercial banking system. This was positive news for 
banks, particularly healthy ones who stood to be asked to contribute most generously to resolution 
packages. 9 
Second, the government’s TBTF policy slowly changed. During the first wave of banking 
failures, the government allowed credit cooperatives and Second Regional banks to fail, but closed no 
First Regional banks or City banks. That changed in the second failure wave with the failure of the 
Hokkaido Takushoku City Bank.  
3.  Methodology and Data 
3.1  Methodology 
We estimate the following equation for bank portfolios 
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where Ri” represents the daily stock return of bank portfolio i on day t,
3 Rmt  represents the market 
portfolio return for day t, proxied in our sample by the return on the TOPIX index, and ei,t  is an i.i.d. 
disturbance term. bi,e  represents the change in the market beta of bank portfolio i subsequent to event e. 
It is quite likely that the market betas of banks varied over the course of our sample, particularly in the 
wake of events that may signal changes in the underlying regulatory regime. We allow for such 
changes by interacting the shift dummy, D1et, which equals one on the day of and after the event e, and 
is zero otherwise, with the return on the market portfolio.
4 gie represents the sensitivity of the bank 
portfolio the bank failure announcement represented by D2et, which takes value one on the event date 
and zero otherwise. Our sample has sixteen event dummies.   
3.2  Data 
Daily closing equity values for 114 Japanese banks were obtained from the Toyo-Keizai 
Kabuka CD-ROM from January 4, 1995 to December 30, 1998. When a stock was not traded on a 
single day, it was assigned the previous day’s closing price. Many Japanese banks list their stocks on 
                                        
3  Using the closing stock prices of the bank i on date t, Pit, the return of each security on date t, Ri,t, is log(Pit)-log(Pit-1). To 
obtain the returns of the portfolio, we average the returns of individual securities in the portfolio. 
4  There are 15 shift dummies. Two pairs of failures, Tanabe Credit and Chogin Osaka Credit, and Yamaichi Securities and 
Tokuyou City Bank, occurred on the same day, and are treated as a single event. These event dates are referred to as 
Chogin and Yamaichi below. Another pair, Kizu Credit Cooperative and Hyogo Bank failed on consecutive days. We 
estimate one shift dummy beginning on the date of the Hyogo failure. 10 
several exchanges, such as Tokyo and Osaka. We use the stock prices on the exchanges where the 
stock was most actively traded.  
Newly-listed or de-listed banks whose equity values were not available were dropped from the 
sample. We also dropped thinly-traded banks, defined as those who reported no transactions on more 
than 100 days in our 988-day sample period. This left us with 94 banks in our sample. 
3.3  Bank category portfolios 
As the bank failure announcements affected all banks in the sample on the failure date, we 
cannot assume that the residual returns would be cross-sectionally independent. A standard response 
in the event study literature, e.g., O’Hara and Shaw (1990), is to use the returns on a portfolio of banks.  
We construct several portfolios of banks based on their administrative category. The bank 
portfolios included are:  
1.  All, all 94 banks in our sample.  
2.  Large, a portfolio of the nine city banks and the Industrial Bank of Japan.  
3.  Trust, a portfolio of seven trust banks.  
4.  Regional, a portfolio of the seventy-seven regional banks. 
As a group, the regional banks would be expected to enjoy less regulatory protection than the 
Trust or the Large banks. It is useful to further divide the Regional banks into two groups, the First 
Regional banks and the Second Regional banks. In general, the First Regional banks are larger and 
have a higher probability to receiving favorable regulatory treatment.  
In addition, there is a possibility that market sensitivity to news concerning bank failures will 
differ by bank financial strength. In particular, changes in the market’s perception of the determination 
of regulatory authorities to maintain the convoy system, under which healthy banks are asked to 
contribute to the costs of resolving failed banks, will affect healthy and weak banks quite differently. 
In response, we also construct portfolios of banks of a certain size category with common financial 
health. We divide the ten largest banks into two groups. Using the Moody’s credit rating shown in 
Table 2, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Sumitomo Bank and Sanwa Bank are included in Large strong.
5 
These banks are commonly considered to be the most sound in Japan [e.g., see Sesit and Webb (1998)]. 
                                        
5  Although Nippon Trust Bank also had an A2 credit rating, we did not include it in the Large strong portfolio because it 
was a small subsidiary company of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.  11 
By chance, these three were also the largest three banks in March 1997. The other seven large banks 
are included in Large weak. We also construct a portfolio of the weakest large banks in our sample, 
Daiwa Bank, Chuou Trust Bank, and Yasuda Trust Bank, in Large weakest.  
For most of the regional banks, credit ratings were not available. To divide regional banks by 
financial soundness, we instead use information from bank dividends.
6 Under the traditional Japanese 
“convoy system,” most banks set their annual dividends per share at the same level, namely, five yen 
or more. Nevertheless, banks experiencing financial difficulties, such as Hyogo Bank in 1992, halted 
dividend payments. As a result, interruption of dividend payments provides a signal of financial 
difficulty.  
We specify problem regional banks as those paying dividends of less than five yen. According 
to the financial statements at the end of March 1997, we find six of the first regional banks and five of 
the second regional banks in our sample paid less than five yen dividends per share.
7 We compile a 
portfolio of the eleven banks titled Regional weak. We also break up this portfolio into the six troubled 
First Regional Banks entitled First Regional weak and the five troubled Second Regional Banks 
entitled Second Regional weak.
8  
Finally, equation (1) calls for the estimation of 31 parameters, including 15 market beta 
coefficients, corresponding to each event date. To obtain a more parsimonious specification, we limit 
the number of shifts in the beta parameter in our specifications below. We only include beta shifts on 
those event dates for which the full specification showed evidence for a beta shift for some group of 
banks at higher than a one-percent confidence level.
9  
On the basis of this criterion, we identified five events as potential shifts in the market beta. 
These include the failures of Hanwa Bank, Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Yamaichi 
Securities and Midori Bank. Of these dates, the Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and 
Yamaichi Securities failures all occurred in November of 1997. We therefore include one beta shift for 
this month, beginning on the date of the Sanyo Securities failure, which occurred first. 
                                        
6  Banks that failed to pay dividends are classified as “unhealthy” under the Financial Stabilization Law of 1998. 
7  Nippon Trust Bank is excluded as it was a subsidiary of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.  
8  The banks included in the First Regional weak portfolio are Hokkaido Bank, Hokuriku Bank, Ikeda Bank, Kantou Bank, 
Kiyou Bank, and Osaka Bank, while the banks included in the Second Regional weak portfolio include Hanshin Bank, 
Kansai Bank, Kinki Bank, Niigata-Chuou Bank, and Tokyo-Sowa Bank. 
9  Estimates including all sixteen event dates as beta shifters had similar results and are available upon request. 12 
4.  Results 
4.1  Bank portfolios grouped by size 
The results for bank portfolios grouped by size are shown in Table 3. Looking at the various 
subgroups, not all event dates had significant impacts on bank equity values. This is not surprising, as 
the market may have already learned about a failed financial institution’s difficulties long before the 
failure announcement. Nevertheless, it is clear that a number of the failure announcements did have a 
significant impact on bank equity values. In all, nine of the sixteen failure events were priced 
significantly by some subgroup. We concentrate our discussion on these events. 
The Cosmo Credit failure was priced positively at the ten percent confidence level for the full 
sample and for the sample of first regional banks, and at the five percent confidence level for the 
sample of trust banks. This result is surprising. As we discussed above, commercial banks were asked 
to contribute to the cost of the resolution of the Cosmo failure. However, the failure of other credit 
cooperatives appears to have limited implications. Neither the Kizu Credit Cooperative nor the Osaka 
Credit Cooperative events were significantly priced by any subgroup.  
The next two significantly priced events were the Hyogo and Hanwa failures. The Hyogo 
failure entered insignificantly in the large bank and trust bank sub-samples, but was significantly 
negative at a ten percent confidence level for the regional banks. Moreover, when we separate the 
Regional banks into the First and Second regional bank sub-samples, we see that only second regional 
bank equity values were adversely impacted by the Hyogo failure at a ten percent confidence level. 
Similarly, the Hanwa failure only entered significantly into the Second regional bank sub-sample. 
The data clearly suggests that the Second Regional banks were considered by the market to 
have greater exposure to failure than the other subgroups through the end of 1996. As Hyogo and 
Hanwa were both Second Regional banks, the announcements of their failures revealed that the 
government was now limiting regulatory protection of financial institutions of this level. With the 
Hanwa failure, the government also confirmed that equity holders would share in the losses stemming 
from bank failures. 
The first event of 1997 in our sample is the Nissan Life Insurance failure. This event was 
priced negatively at a five-percent confidence level for the full sample, and at a ten percent confidence 
level for the Large banks and Regional banks sub-samples. The Nissan failure had adverse 13 
implications for all banks’ abilities to acquire capital in the future. Life insurance companies were an 
important source of capital for banks, as they were the primary purchasers of preferred stocks and 
engaged in extensive subordinated lending to banks.  
The Chogin Osaka failure also followed the pattern of greater investor discipline for the 
Second Regional banks. The failure was significantly negatively priced for the All banks, Regional 
banks, and Second Regional banks groups. However, among the individual subgroups, only the 
Second Regional bank subgroup priced the failure significantly negatively. This indicates that the 
sensitivity of the Second Regional bank subgroup is driving the performance of the All banks and 
Regional banks subgroups. 
The first bank failure event which adversely affected the large bank portfolio at standard 
confidence levels was that of Kyoto Kyoei bank in October 1997. It is unclear why the failure of Kyoto 
Kyoei should have significantly affected the market’s perception of the regulatory protection from 
failure enjoyed by large banks. Instead, it appears more likely that large bank sensitivity to the Kyoto 
Kyoei failure was attributable to the perception that its resolution implied increased large bank 
regulatory burdens. We provide some evidence along these lines below, after separating financially 
strong and weak large banks. 
For the remaining three events in 1997, the failures of Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku, 
and Yamaichi securities, the regional bank subgroups were adversely affected at standard confidence 
levels, while the large banks were not. These failures are also the first that were priced negatively by 
the First Regional bank portfolio. By allowing a City bank to fail under the proper circumstances, the 
regulatory authorities had made it clear that all banks below that level of regulatory status, such as the 
First Regional banks, no longer enjoyed TBTF protection.
10 
The fact that the Hokkaido Takushoku and Yamaichi Securities failures were not priced 
significantly by the large bank portfolio is somewhat surprising. The Hokkaido Takushoku failure 
demonstrated the unwillingness or inability of Japanese officials to avoid failures under any 
circumstances, even in the cases of the largest City Banks. Below, we investigate whether the 
                                        
10  Surprisingly, the Second Regional bank portfolio was not significant. However, this was due to high standard errors. For 
two of the three events in November 1997, the point estimate on the Second Regional bank coefficient exceeded that 
obtained for the First Regional bank subgroup. 
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insignificant coefficient on the large bank portfolio may be attributable to heterogeneity in the 
implications of the details of the Hokkaido Takushoku resolution for strong and weak banks.  
The three bank failures in 1998, Midori, LTCB, and Nippon Credit, produced no significant 
effects. This is not a surprise in the case of Midori. Its resolution program was shaped by the desire of 
the government to mitigate damages to the area subsequent to the Kobe earthquake and had few 
implications for the general regulatory regime.  
Finally, the Hanwa and Sanyo beta shifters indicate increasing risk from the point of those 
events until the end of the sample period. As both of these failures occurred in periods of escalating 
uncertainty, their performance is intuitive. On the other hand, the Midori beta-shifter indicates a 
reduction of uncertainty in the banking sector in 1998.
11 
4.2  Implications of bank financial strength 
Results with the subgroups further divided by financial strength are shown in Table 4. The 
results reveal some interesting disparities between the sensitivities of weak and strong banks. 
As above, we see that only regional banks were adversely affected by the Hanwa and Hyogo 
bank failures at standard confidence levels. As was the case for the full subgroups, only weak Regional 
banks and Second Regional banks were negatively affected at standard confidence levels. The 
subgroup of weak Second Regional banks was more sensitive to the news of the Hyogo failure than the 
entire group of second regional banks. The weak Second Regional Banks lost 1.8% of their equity 
value on the day, while the Second Regional Banks as a whole lost only 0.6%. Similarly, the 
coefficient estimate on the event date for the weak Second Regional bank subgroup is greater and 
enters at a higher level of significance than the entire group. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that at the time of the Hyogo Bank closure, Second Regional banks were perceived to enjoy 
much lower levels of regulatory protection than the other bank classes. 
                                        
11  To investigate the robustness of our results, we also examined a three-day event window. By and large, the results were 
very similar to those with a one-day event window. There are, however, two notable differences: First, all subgroups of 
banks, including the largest banks, priced the Yamaichi Securities failure negatively with the three-day event window. 
Second, the closure of LTCB was priced significantly positive for both the Large bank portfolio and the Trust bank 
portfolio with a three-day event window. These results are available from the authors upon request.  
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Another interesting disparity with the results above concerns the First Regional bank group. 
While the whole First Regional banks group was not affected by the announcement of the Hanwa 
failure at standard confidence levels, the subset of Weak First Regional banks was significantly 
adversely affected by the event. The same result emerges for the Nissan Life Insurance failure. This 
indicates that the degree of regulatory protection during this period for First Regional banks was also 
in question. 
The most interesting disparities by financial strength appear among the Large banks subgroup 
during the Hokkaido Takushoku and Yamaichi Securities failures, which both took place in November 
of 1997. Recall that the event dates for both of these failures for the entire group entered 
insignificantly with a positive sign. When separated by financial strength, however, we see significant 
disparity between the strong and weak Large banks subgroups. The Weak Large banks subgroup 
priced the events significantly negatively. This result seems consistent with the possibility that the 
Hokkaido Takushoku and Yamaichi Securities failures indicated that no financial institutions were 
TBTF.  
However, the Strong Large banks subgroup priced the events significantly positively. News 
about the degree of TBTF protection would be expected to have little impact on the strongest banks, 
whose probability of failure was close to zero. Instead, it appears that the primary impact of these 
failures on strong large bank equity values was their implications for healthy commercial banks’ 
responsibilities in the future resolution of failed banks. The resolution of the Hokkaido Takushoku and 
Yamaichi Securities failures did not require commercial bank assistance. This explains the event’s 
positive pricing for strong large bank equity values. This disparity in the sensitivity of equity values to 
the Yamaichi Securities failure is consistent with Peek and Rosengren (1998), who found that its 
failure enlarged the difference between interest rate premia among strong and weak Japanese banks.
12 
                                        
12  We also investigated the bank financial strength sub-sample results with three-day event windows. Our results were 
again largely similar, with two notable exceptions: First, the coefficient on the Hokkaido Takushoku failure for the 
strong large bank subgroup was smaller and no longer statistically significant. Second, the Wakayamaken Credit 
Corporation and LTCB failure announcements in 1998 were priced significantly positive for the weak large bank 
subgroup. While the intuition behind the Wakayamaken result is unclear, the results for the LTCB failure may be 
understood as the positive reaction of weak large banks to the news that the government was once again willing to 
contribute public funds for the resolution of large failed banks. 16 
5.  Cross-sectional Evidence 
5.1  Methodology 
This section investigates the cross-sectional evidence concerning the evolution of 
too-big-to-fail policy over the sample period. Following Brewer, et al (1999) we proceed in two 
stages: First, we estimate excess returns for each of the 94 banks in our sample. Second, we regress 
these estimated coefficients on several fundamental variables including the size of each bank. Our 
three samples consist of 55 First Regional Banks, 22 Second Regional Banks, and 10 City Banks and 7 
Trust Banks respectively.  
We use the natural log of total assets, Assets, as a proxy for bank size. If market participants 
believe that large banks enjoy greater too-big-to-fail regulatory protection, the sensitivity of asset 
prices to adverse news would be negatively related to bank size. For adverse news such as a bank 
failure, we would expect a positive coefficient on Assets. 
We also examine bank asset risk. Previous studies [Aharony and Swany, (1996); Flannery and 
Sorescu, (1996); and Yamori, (1999a)] have argued that evidence that returns are responsive to bank 
risk factors indicate investor discipline, and hence diminished regulatory protection. We introduce 
three bank risk measures: First, we use a dummy variable indicating dividend payments of less than 
five yen per share, Lowdiv. Dividend payments above this level are the norm. Falling below that level 
therefore indicates financial distress. We would expect a negative coefficient on this proxy. We also 
use the returns on equity, ROE, as a proxy for current performance or profitability. We would expect 
that the coefficient on ROE is positive. Finally, we use the ratio of bad loans in the bank’s lending 
portfolio, Badloan. Our definition includes loans with delayed or reduced payments, as well as loans 
to bankrupt firms. We would expect a negative coefficient on Badloan.
13 Individual statistics are 
calculated as of the end of March 1997.  
                                        
13  Bank capital-asset ratios are unavailable as risk measures. There are two different standards for the calculation of this 
ratio in Japanese banks: The MOF standard, which is primarily used by small banks, and the Bank for International 
Settlements standard. Eight banks in our sample disclosed their capital ratios based on the MOF standard. Moreover, 
eleven of the banks in our sample did not disclose their capital ratios at all.  17 
5.2  Results 
The second-stage estimation results are shown in Table 5. Table 5a shows the results for the 
Second Regional banks. The results for the early failure of the Cosmo Credit Cooperatives are poor. 
The Cosmo regression obtained very low R
2, and the ROE variable enters significantly at the five 
percent confidence level with the incorrect positive sign.  
In contrast, there is some evidence of risk pricing throughout the rest of the sample, indicating 
that beginning with the failure of the Kizu Credit corporation, the regulatory protection of the Second 
Regional banks was questioned. The Assets variable enters with its expected positive sign in the Kizu 
Credit Cooperative and in the NCB failures at five and ten percent confidence levels respectively. The 
Badloan variable enters with its expected negative sign at a five percent confidence level in the 
Yamaichi Securities failure. The ROE variable enters with its expected positive signs at five percent 
confidence levels in the Kizu Credit Corporation and the Taiheyo Bank failures. Finally, the Lowdiv 
variable enters with its expected negative sign in the Hyogo, Hanwa, and Hokkaido Takushoku 
failures at five percent confidence levels. However, the variable enters with the wrong sign in the 
Yamaichi Securities failure at the ten-percent confidence level. Nevertheless, the risk indicators enter 
with their expected coefficient signs in eight of the nine cases in which they enter significantly at 
standard confidence levels. 
Table 5b gives our results for the First Regional Banks. In general, the results for the First 
Regional banks are inferior to those for the Second Regional banks. Many of the coefficients enter 
with the incorrect sign. For example, while the Log(Assets) variable enters with its predicted positive 
sign at a ten percent confidence level during the Hyogo Bank failure, it enters with the incorrect sign at 
a five percent confidence level in the Chogin Osaka Credit Corporation and Yamaichi Securities 
failures. Similar mixed results are reported for the ROE and Lowdiv variables. However, the Badloan 
enters with its predicted negative signs for the Osaka Credit Corporation, the Chogin Osaka Credit 
Corporation, and the Yamaichi Securities failures at greater than ten-percent confidence levels. 
Finally, Table 5c displays the results for the City Banks and Trust Banks. The Lowdiv variable 
must be dropped from our specification for this regression, because none of the City Banks or Trust 18 
Banks failed to issue dividends of at least five yen per share.
14 The results are again mixed. The ROE 
and Badloan variables enter significantly with both correct and incorrect signs. However, the Assets 
variable enters with its expected positive sign in the Osaka Credit Corporation, Midori, and Sanyo 
bank failures. Presumably, this reflects differences in the perceived regulatory treatment of City Banks 
and Trust Banks. 
In summary, the results do provide some suggestive evidence that the market perceived the 
Second Regional banks to be less protected by regulatory guarantees than either First Regional or City 
and Trust Banks. While the risk factors appear to enter as predicted in a number of the failures in the 
Second regional Bank sample, we often see these factors entering with incorrect signs in the other 
samples.  
To examine this possibility formally, we conducted F and log likelihood ratio tests of the 
validity of pooling these sub-samples for the cross-sectional regression report on above. Our results 
are reported in Table 6.  
Pooling is rejected for all of the potential pairs of subgroups tested for the Cosmo Credit 
Corporation. Again, it is difficult to interpret the empirical performance of banks corresponding to this 
bank’s failure announcement, so we concentrate on the remaining fifteen event dates. 
Comparing the Second Regional banks and the rest of the sample, we see that pooling is 
rejected for the Taiheiyo and Kyoto Kyoei bank failures. These failures occurred on April 1996 and 
November 1997 respectively. Comparing the Second Regional banks and First Regional banks, we see 
that pooling is rejected for four failures, the Hanwa bank, Chogin Osaka Credit Corporation, Kyoto 
Kyoei Bank, and Yamaichi Securities failures. These failures all took place between November of 
1996 and November of 1997. Comparing the First Regional banks and the City and Trust banks, we 
reject the null hypothesis that pooling is valid at standard confidence levels Chogin Osaka, Kyoto 
Kyoei, Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku, and Yamaichi Securities failures. These failures took 
place from May of 1997 through November of 1997. Finally, comparing the City and Trust banks 
against the Regional Banks as a group, we reject the pooling assumption for the Kyoto Kyoei bank 
                                        
14 An exception is the Nippon Trust Bank, which is a subsidiary of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. It is not included in the 
Lowdiv group because its failure to pay dividends is unrelated to its financial position.  19 
failure, the Hokkaido Takushoku bank failure, and the Yamaichi Securities failure. These failures took 
place in the relatively short interval from October 14, 1997 through November 25, 1997. 
In summary, our cross-sectional evidence suggests two features in the data: First, the 
cross-sectional regressions suggest that investors treated the Second Regional banks differently than 
the other banks in our sample. In particular, risk factors had greater explanatory power for the Second 
Regional banks than either the First Regional banks or the City and Trust banks groups. This finding 
would be consistent with the hypothesis that the Second Regional banks enjoyed systematically less 
regulatory protection over the sample period, particularly up to the failure of Hanwa bank at the end of 
1996.  
However, formal testing for the validity of pooling across these subgroups revealed that the 
differences among these subgroups were greatest over a relatively short time interval. With the 
exception of the Cosmo Credit Corporation failure, which rejected pooling for all pairs of sub-groups, 
all of the statistically significant differences between sub-groups arose for failures that took place 
between April of 1996 and November of 1997.  
The evidence is therefore consistent with the notion that there was a period with little 
systematic differences in regulatory protection, followed by a brief period in which first the Second 
Regional Banks and then the First Regional banks lost their regulatory status and were treated 
differently by investors. However, once it was revealed that large banks were also exposed to the risk 
of failure, these regulatory differences diminished. 
6.  Conclusion 
The data presented above indicate that investors were following the regulatory behavior of the 
Ministry of Finance, and not just its stated policies, in assessing the regulatory regime in place for the 
commercial banking system. After experiencing a number of bank failures, market investors 
recognized that the government had decreased the coverage of its too-big-to-fail policy.  
The gradual changes in the sensitivity of equity prices to bank failure announcements can 
therefore be better understood as reflections of the market’s uncertainty about the current regulatory 
regime than investor irrationality. Indeed, our results indicate that market participants were following 
these announcements in an effort to ascertain the current regulatory regime. Investors responded to 20 
failure announcements by updating their beliefs concerning the solidity of regulatory protection across 
different classes of banks. 
These responses indicate that Japanese regulatory policy evolved over the course of our sample 
period. Prior to the failure of the Hyogo Bank, investors behaved as if all banks were secured from 
failure. However, the failure of the Hyogo bank, the largest Second Regional bank at the time, revealed 
that regulatory protection for the Second Regional banks was not absolute. Investors responded to this 
discrepancy by treating subsequent news about bank failures differently for the Second Regional 
banks than the other groups of banks. With the failure of the Hanwa bank, we saw that investors had 
also come to doubt the regulatory status of First Regional banks. At that point, financially weak First 
Regional banks also began to be sensitive to adverse news. Finally, with the failure of Hokkaido 
Takushoku, weak City banks also exhibited sensitivity to adverse news. 
Our cross-sectional evidence suggests a similar pattern. The data consistently reveals that 
excess returns for Second Regional banks were more closely tied to risk indicators, suggesting that 
investors considered the Second Regional banks to enjoy weaker regulatory guarantees than the larger 
First Regional and City banks.  
However, our formal pooling tests only reveal statistically significant distinctions between the 
groups for a limited period. This evidence is also consistent with the notion that the market considered 
all banks to be secure from failure risk early in our sample, followed by a temporary period in which 
first the Second Regional banks, and then the First Regional banks, lost their regulatory advantages. 
Finally, with the closure of Hokkaido Takushoku, it was revealed that all banks were exposed to failure, 
and we no longer found measurable differences across these sub-groups. 
It is unclear whether this regime is still in place. We failed to find any significant negative 
pricing of bank failures during 1998. This suggests that the announcement that public funds were 
again available for the resolution of failed banks may have led investors to believe in the resumption of 
regulatory guarantees in Japan.21 
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Major Japanese Financial Failures: 1995-1998 
 
Event Date   Financial Institution  Deposit Insurance 
Expense 
(100 million yen) 
     
7-31-95  Cosmo Credit Cooperative  1,250 
8-30-95  Kizu Credit Cooperative  10,340 
8-31-95  Hyogo Bank  4,730 
12-7-95  Osaka Credit Cooperative  2,526 
     
4-1-96  Taiheiyo Bank  1,170 
11-21-96  Hanwa Bank  2,960 
     
4-25-97  Nissan Life Insurance  NA 
5-14-97  Tanabe Credit Cooperative  1,081 
5-14-97  Chogin Osaka Credit Coop.  3,159 
10-14-97  Kyoto Kyoei Bank  1,019 
11-04-97  Sanyo Securities  NA 
11-17-97  Hokkaido Takushoku Bank  33,726 
11-25-97  Yamaichi Securities  NA 
11-25-97  Tokuyou City Bank  2,888 
     
3-17-98  Wakayamaken Shoko Credit Coop.  2,193 
5-15-98  Midori Bank  10,560 
10-23-98  Long-term Credit Bank of Japan  NA 










a  Major bank and large credit cooperative failures include all failures whose resolution costs to the DIC exceeded 
100 million yen. 24 
Table 2
a 
Major Japanese Banks 
 
Moody’s Long-term deposit credit rating 
 
  Large Banks  Trust Banks 
A1  Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Sanwa  
     
A2  Sumitomo  Nippon-Trust 
   
A3  Daiichi-Kangyo,  
Industrial Bank of Japan 
     
Baa1  Sakura, Fuji, Asahi, Tokai  Mitsubishi-Trust, Sumitomo-Trust, Toyo-Trust 
    
Baa2   Mitsui-Trust 
     
Baa3  Hokkaido-Takushoku, Daiwa, 
Long-Term Credit Bank,  
















a  Ratings as of October, 1998.  25 
Table 3
a 
















               
7-31-95  Cosmo CC  0.0043*  0.0006  0.0150**  0.0038  0.0045*  0.0020 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
8-30-95  Kizu CC  0.0000  -0.0039  0.0018  0.0004  0.0006  -0.0002 
    (0.0024)  (0.0054)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
8-31-95  Hyogo  -0.0036  0.0028  -0.0060  -0.0042*  -0.0036  -0.0059* 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
12-7-95  Osaka CC  0.0002  0.0014  -0.0002  0.0001  0.0004  -0.0008 
    (0.0024)  (0.0054)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0033) 
               
4-1-96  Taiheiyo  0.0025  -0.0031  0.0063  0.0029  0.0038  0.0008 
    (0.0024)  (0.0054)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
11-21-96  Hanwa  -0.0016  0.0024  0.0017  -0.0024  -0.0012  -0.0056* 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
4-25-97  Nissan Life  -0.0051**  -0.0099*  -0.0088  -0.0041*  -0.0039  -0.0046 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
5-14-97  Chogin Osaka CC  -0.0040*  0.0004  -0.0093  -0.0041*  -0.0035  -0.0055* 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
10-14-97  Kyoto Kyoei  -0.0023  -0.0141**  -0.0049  -0.0005  0.0013  -0.0050 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
11-4-97  Sanyo Securities  -0.0033  0.0051  -0.0039  -0.0044*  -0.0041*  -0.0052 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
11-17-97  Hokkaido   -0.0052**  -0.0028  -0.0043  -0.0056**  -0.0056**  -0.0056 
  Takushoku  (0.0024)  (0.0058)  (0.0081)  (0.0026)  (0.0027)  (0.0035) 
 
a  Estimation by ordinary least squares. CC indicates Credit corporations. Failed entities are banks unless otherwise 
























               
11-25-97  Yamaichi   -0.0060**  0.0034  -0.0119  -0.0067**  -0.0081**  -0.0032 
  Securities  (0.0024)  (0.0056)  (0.0078)  (0.0025)  (0.0026)  (0.0034) 
               
3-17-98  Wakayamaken   -0.0009  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0011  -0.0012  -0.0008 
  CC  (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
5-15-98  Midori  -0.0018  -0.0019  -0.0068  -0.0014  -0.0019  -0.0000 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
10-23-98  Long-Term Credit  -0.0016  0.0066  -0.0014  -0.0027  -0.0028  -0.0025 
    (0.0024)  (0.0053)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
               
12-14-98  Nippon Credit  0.0016  -0.0006  -0.0044  0.0024  0.0021  0.0031 
    (0.0024)  (0.0054)  (0.0075)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0033) 
               
  Constant  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
    (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
               
  Beta  0.7207**  1.3165**  1.5033**  0.5722**  0.6371**  0.4098** 
    (0.0261)  (0.0580)  (0.0812)  (0.0264)  (0.0269)  (0.0352) 
               
  Hanwa Beta   0.0717*  0.2971**  0.2496**  0.0263  -0.0091  0.1146** 
    (0.0411)  (0.0914)  (0.1278)  (0.0415)  (0.0423)  (0.0555) 
               
  Sanyo Beta  0.1830**  0.5464**  0.5579**  0.1017**  0.1214**  0.0526 
    (0.0462)  (0.1027)  (0.1436)  (0.0467)  (0.0476)  (0.0623) 
               
  Midori Beta  -0.1491**  -0.1830*  -0.3314**  -0.1281**  -0.1173**  -0.1553** 
    (0.0453)  (0.1007)  (0.1408)  (0.0457)  (0.0466)  (0.0611) 
               
  # of observations  92,872  9,880  6,916  76,076  54,340  21,736 
  R-squared  0.7699  0.7537  0.6447  0.6434  0.6725  0.3863 
  Adj. R-squared  0.7651  0.7486  0.6373  0.6360  0.6658  0.3736 



























               
7-31-95  Cosmo CC  -0.0016  0.0016  0.0035  0.0072  0.0122**  0.0012 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
8-30-95  Kizu CC  -0.0044  -0.0037  0.0003  0.0006  0.0021  -0.0011 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
8-31-95  Hyogo  -0.0051  0.0062  0.0013  -0.0117**  -0.0066  -0.0178** 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
12-7-95  Osaka CC  0.0003  0.0019  0.0021  -0.0004  0.0030  -0.0044 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
4-1-96  Taiheiyo  -0.0040  -0.0027  0.0057  0.0025  0.0086  -0.0049 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
11-21-96  Hanwa  0.0017  0.0027  0.0035  -0.0162**  -0.0124**  -0.0207** 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
4-25-97  Nissan Life  -0.0066  -0.0038  -0.0526**  -0.0077  -0.0115**  -0.0031 
    (0.0057)  (0.0066)  (0.0063)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
5-14-97  Chogin Osaka CC  -0.0032  0.0020  -0.0001  -0.0045  -0.0014  -0.0082 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
10-14-97  Kyoto Kyoei  -0.0213**  -0.0110*  0.0016  -0.0086  0.0057  -0.0120 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
11-4-97  Sanyo Securities  0.0089  0.0035  -0.0013  -0.0089  -0.0071  -0.0109 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
11-17-97  Hokkaido   0.0180**  -0.0118*  -0.0311**  -0.0236**  -0.0241**  -0.0230** 
  Takushoku  (0.0062)  (0.0068)  (0.0117)  (0.0061)  (0.0062)  (0.0090) 
 
a  Estimation by ordinary least squares. CC indicates Credit corporations. Failed entities are banks unless otherwise 


























               
11-25-97  Yamaichi   0.0203**  -0.0038  -0.0526**  -0.0165**  -0.0177**  -0.0150* 
  Securities  (0.0060)  (0.0066)  (0.0114)  (0.0059)  (0.0060)  (0.0088) 
               
3-17-98  Wakayamaken   -0.0067  0.0025  0.0009  -0.0016  0.0005  -0.0041 
  CC  (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
5-15-98  Midori  0.0026  -0.0038  -0.0021  0.0003  -0.0013  0.0023 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
10-23-98  Long-Term Credit  0.0061  0.0069  0.0012  -0.0014  -0.0021  -0.0005 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
12-14-98  Nippon Credit  -0.0035  0.0007  -0.0023  -0.0014  -0.0001  -0.0029 
    (0.0057)  (0.0063)  (0.0109)  (0.0057)  (0.0058)  (0.0084) 
               
  Constant  0.0000  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0001 
    (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
               
  Beta  1.3727**  1.293**  1.1786**  0.6821**  0.6750**  0.6906** 
    (0.0620)  (0.0682)  (0.1182)  (0.0615)  (0.0625)  (0.0910) 
               
  Hanwa Beta   0.1953**  0.3407**  0.5059**  0.0773  -0.0177  0.1913 
    (0.0977)  (0.1075)  (0.1861)  (0.0968)  (0.0984)  (0.1433) 
               
  Sanyo Beta  0.1738  0.7061**  1.0377**  0.3937**  0.6301**  0.1101 
    (0.1098)  (0.1208)  (0.2091)  (0.1087)  (0.1106)  (0.1610) 
               
  Midori Beta  0.1667  -0.3329**  -1.0005**  -0.6789**  -0.7949**  -0.5397** 
    (0.1077)  (0.1184)  (0.2050)  (0.1066)  (0.1084)  (0.1579) 
               
  # of observations  2,964  6,916  2,964  10,868  5,928  4,940 
  R-squared  0.7028  0.7020  0.4688  0.3698  0.3795  0.2038 
  Adj. R-squared  0.6966  0.6958  0.4578  0.3567  0.3666  0.1873 






Second Regional Banks  
               
Date  Failure event  Constant  Assets  Badloan  ROE  Lowdiv  Adj R
2 
7-31-95  Cosmo CC  0.088  -0.013  -0.273  -0.033**  -0.006  0.066 
    (1.041)  (-.945)  (-1.387)  (-2.331)  (-.956)   
8-30-95  Kizu CC  -0.097**  0.015**  0.103  0.011**  0  0.308 
    (-3.450)  (3.416)  (1.572)  (2.325)  (.205)   
8-31-95  Hyogo  -0.084  0.012  0.176  -0.003  -0.021**  0.14 
    (-.686)  (.644)  (.618)  (-.129)  (-2.214)   
12-7-95  Osaka CC  -0.104  0.017  -0.194  0.003  0.002  0.045 
    (-1.240)  (1.321)  (-.994)  (.178)  (.315)   
4-1-96  Taiheiyo  -0.127  0.02  0.252  0.035**  -0.001  0.224 
    (-1.562)  (1.535)  (1.328)  (2.575)  (-.095)   
11-21-96  Hanwa  -0.04  0.006  0.158  0.009  -0.02**  0.777 
    (-.894)  (.793)  (1.532)  (1.188)  (-5.982)   
4-25-97  Nissan  -0.125  0.019  0.06  -0.007  -0.002  0.015 
    (-1.473)  (1.424)  (.303)  (-.501)  (-.305)   
5-14-97  Chogin Osaka   -0.01  0.001  -0.064  -0.014  -0.007  0.001 
    (-.171)  (.126)  (-.459)  (-1.367)  (-1.490)   
10-14-97  Kyoto Kyoei  0.142  -0.024  0.157  0.006  -0.012  0.087 
    (1.312)  (-1.398)  (.624)  (.349)  (-1.391)   
11-4-97  Sanyo  -0.144  0.023  -0.061  0.013  0  0.03 
    (-1.397)  (1.397)  (-.253)  (.735)  (-.040)   
11-17-97  Hokkaido Takushoku  0.027  -0.006  0.365  0.003  -0.032**  0.305 
    (.206)  (-.280)  (1.193)  (.140)  (-3.100)   
11-25-97  Yamaichi  -0.15  0.028  -0.931**  0.031  0.023*  0.448 
    (-.936)  (1.090)  (-2.502)  (1.147)  (1.851)   
3-17-98  Wakayamaken   -0.022  0.004  -0.031  0.012  0.001  0.137 
    (-.454)  (.476)  (-.275)  (1.468)  (.296)   
5-15-98  Midori  -0.075  0.012  0.113  -0.008  -0.003  -0.113 
    (-.648)  (.632)  (.419)  (-.388)  (-.291)   
10-23-98  LTCB  0.035  -0.006  0.036  0.013  0.006  -0.022 
    (.503)  (-.575)  (.221)  (1.131)  (1.211)   
12-14-98  NCB  -0.129  0.021*  0.165  0.02  -0.004  0.139 
    (-1.640)  (1.675)  (.902)  (1.533)  (-.696)   
 
a  T-statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10 and 5 percent confidence levels 







First Regional Banks  
 
Date  Failure event  Constant  Assets  Badloan  ROE  Lowdiv  Adj R
2 
7-31-95  Cosmo CC  -0.022  0.004  0.017  -0.018  0.004  0.098 
    (-.753)  (.879)  (.235)  (-1.491)  (.969)   
8-30-95  Kizu CC  0.012  -0.002  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.061 
    (.572)  (-.548)  (.014)  (-.085)  (.421)   
8-31-95  Hyogo  -0.061*  0.009*  0.008  -0.032**  -0.01*  0.074 
    (-1.879)  (1.795)  (.096)  (-2.306)  (-1.888)   
12-7-95  Osaka CC  0.021  -0.003  -0.106*  0.017*  0.01**  0.078 
    (.874)  (-.807)  (-1.708)  (1.678)  (2.530)   
4-1-96  Taiheiyo  0.022  -0.003  -0.01  0.025*  0.011**  0.042 
    (.723)  (-.638)  (-.122)  (1.889)  (2.220)   
11-21-96  Hanwa  -0.029  0.005  -0.007  -0.025**  -0.017**  0.361 
    (-1.327)  (1.370)  (-.120)  (-2.665)  (-5.031)   
4-25-97  Nissan  0.013  -0.002  -0.102  -0.014  -0.008**  0.143 
    (.500)  (-.516)  (-1.564)  (-1.258)  (-2.033)   
5-14-97  Chogin Osaka   0.045**  -0.007**  0.023  -0.007  0  0.145 
    (2.717)  (-2.930)  (.560)  (-.960)  (-.181)   
10-14-97  Kyoto Kyoei  0.014  -0.002  -0.043  -0.015  -0.01**  0.091 
    (.511)  (-.376)  (-.632)  (-1.358)  (-2.342)   
11-4-97  Sanyo  0.01  -0.002  -0.007  -0.006  -0.005  -0.031 
    (.413)  (-.543)  (-.108)  (-.563)  (-1.205)   
11-17-97  Hokkaido Takushoku  0.07  -0.01  -0.519**  -0.009  -0.007  0.303 
    (1.250)  (-1.118)  (-3.669)  (-.398)  (-.754)   
11-25-97  Yamaichi  0.149**  -0.022**  -0.661**  -0.059**  -0.004  0.354 
    (2.389)  (-2.242)  (-4.189)  (-2.252)  (-.399)   
3-17-98  Wakayamaken CC  -0.054*  0.008  0.076  -0.006  -0.001  0.008 
    (-1.698)  (1.602)  (.948)  (-.477)  (-.273)   
5-15-98  Midori  -0.059  0.008  0.105  0.015  0.001  -0.009 
    (-1.292)  (1.181)  (.910)  (.775)  (.158)   
10-23-98  LTCB  -0.018  0.002  0.116  -0.001  -0.003  -0.042 
    (-.481)  (.346)  (1.213)  (-.079)  -(.534)   
12-14-98  NCB  0.035  -0.005  0.001  0.011  -0.001  -0.022 
    (1.321)  (-1.233)  (.021)  (.961)  (-.173)   
 
a  T-statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10 and 5 percent confidence levels 





City and Trust Banks  
Date  Failure event  Constant  Assets  Badloan  ROE  Adj R
2 
7-31-95  Cosmo CC  0.113*  -0.015*  -0.022  0.066**  0.679 
    (1.841)  (-1.874)  (-.300)  (2.611)   
8-30-95  Kizu CC  -0.036  0.004  0.107**  0.019  0.322 
    (-.865)  (.696)  (2.135)  (1.116)   
8-31-95  Hyogo  0.006  0  -0.052  -0.05*  0.264 
    (.092)  (-.031)  (-.651)  (-1.839)   
12-7-95  Osaka CC  -0.063*  0.008*  0.068  0  0.092 
    (-1.751)  (1.773)  (1.570)  (-.019)   
4-1-96  Taiheiyo  -0.019  0.001  0.161**  0.006  0.469 
    (-.369)  (.198)  (2.567)  (.297)   
11-21-96  Hanwa  -0.028  0.004  0.046*  0.006  -0.002 
    (-1.230)  (1.272)  (1.676)  (.651)   
4-25-97  Nissan  0.007  -0.002  -0.039  -0.002  -0.213 
    (.087)  (-.183)  (-.384)  (-.067)   
5-14-97  Chogin Osaka CC  -0.085  0.011  0.038  0.018  -0.121 
    (-.955)  (.945)  (.355)  (.494)   
10-14-97  Kyoto Kyoei  -0.004  -0.002  0.118  0.095  0.208 
    (-.024)  (-.117)  (.617)  (1.454)   
11-4-97  Sanyo  -0.127**  0.017**  0  0.031  0.426 
    (-2.223)  (2.389)  (.000)  (1.318)   
11-17-97  Hokkaido Takushogu  0.072  -0.008  -0.341**  0.144**  0.4 
    (.527)  (-.463)  (-2.063)  (2.559)   
11-25-97  Yamaichi  0.043  -0.002  -0.502  0.081  0.109 
    (.155)  (-.065)  (-1.500)  (.712)   
3-17-98  Wakayamaken  0.019  -0.003  0.009  -0.029  -0.113 
    (.306)  (-.328)  (.123)  (-1.110)   
5-15-98  Midori  -0.107*  0.013*  0.069  0.022  0.058 
    (-1.896)  (1.862)  (1.005)  (.959)   
10-23-98  LTCB  -0.003  0.001  -0.079  0.036  -0.087 
    (-.033)  (.113)  (-.674)  (.892)   
12-14-98  NCB  -0.057  0.007  0.066  0.011  -0.177 
    (-.758)  (.718)  (.722)  (.368)   
 
a  T-statistics are in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10 and 5 percent confidence levels 





Tests for the differences in responses across bank categories 
 








    F-stat  LLR  F-stat  LLR  F-stat  LLR  F-stat  LLR 
7-31-95  Cosmo CC  2.75**  14.24**  2.14*  11.42**  6.01**  22.96**  6.35**  24.34** 
    (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.071)  (0.044)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
8-30-95  Kizu CC  1.84  7.72*  1.11  6.15  0.75  3.30  1.32  5.6 
    (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.36)  (0.29)  (0.56)  (0.51)  (0.27)  (0.23) 
8-31-95  Hyogo  1.40  5.93  1.40  7.63  0.45  2.01  0.62  2.66 
    (0.24)  (0.20)  (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.77)  (0.73)  (0.65)  (0.62) 
12-7-95  Osaka CC  1.34  5.67  1.49  8.10  1.00  4.38  0.85  3.66 
    (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.15)  (0.41)  (0.36)  (0.5)  (0.45) 
4-1-96  Taiheiyo  1.97  8.25*  1.52  8.25  0.54  2.41  1.03  4.4 
    (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.2)  (0.14)  (0.70)  (0.66)  (0.4)  (0.36) 
11-21-96  Hanwa  1.46  6.16  2.86**  14.88**  1.63  6.97  1.5  6.33 
    (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.18) 
4-25-97  Nissan  1.65  6.94  1.1  6.08  0.46  2.06  0.89  3.81 
    (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.37)  (0.3)  (0.76)  (0.76)  (0.47)  (0.43) 
5-14-97  Chogin Osaka CC  0.97  4.13  2.99**  15.52**  1.9  8.07*  0.94  4.0 
    (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.45)  (0.41) 
10-14-97  Kyoto Kyoei  1.94  8.12*  2.81**  14.64**  2.58**  10.75**  3.0**  12.28** 
    (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
11-4-97  Sanyo  1.05  4.46  1.16  6.40  2.28*  9.59**  1.33  5.62 
    (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.34)  (0.27)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.27)  (0.23) 
11-17-97  Hokkaido Takushoku  0.61  2.64  1.45  7.91  6.11**  23.3**  5.9**  22.79** 
    (0.65)  (0.62)  (0.22)  (0.16)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
11-25-97  Yamaichi  1.23  5.22  2.60**  13.68**  5.11**  19.96**  5.23**  20.48** 
    (0.31)  (0.27)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
3-17-98  Wakayamaken  1.09  4.66  0.90  5.01  0.88  3.84  1.01  4.30 
    (0.37)  (0.33)  (0.49)  (0.42)  (0.48)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (0.37) 
5-15-98  Midori  0.65  2.81  0.46  2.6  1.34  5.81  1.36  5.76 
    (0.63)  (0.59)  (0.81)  (0.76)  (0.26)  (0.21)  (0.26)  (0.22) 
10-23-98  LTCB  0.39  1.71  0.37  2.09  0.89  3.92  1.29  5.48 
    (0.81)  (0.79)  (0.87)  (0.83)  (0.47)  (0.42)  (0.28)  (0.24) 
12-14-98  NCB  1.46  6.18  1.21  6.63  0.67  2.94  0.68  2.92 
    (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.32)  (0.25)  (0.62)  (0.57)  (0.61)  (0.57) 
 
a  P-values are in parentheses. (CB+TB+FRB)vsSRB tests whether the cross-section equation for the Second Regional Banks (SRB) 
is the same as that for other banks, including City Banks(CB), Trust Banks(TB), and the First Regional Banks(FRB)). Sample 
includes 10 city banks, 7 trust banks, 55 First Regional banks, and 22 second regional banks. Samples including City and Trust 
banks do not include Lowdiv variable in specification to avoid singularity problem. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 10 
and 5 percent confidence levels respectively. 